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1 Introduction
Economics can be distinguished from other social sciences by the belief that
most (all?) behavior can be explained by assuming that agents have stable,
well-deﬁned preferences and make rational choices consistent with those pref-
erences in markets that (eventually) clear. An empirical result qualiﬁes as
an anomaly if it is diﬃcult to rationalize or if implausible assumptions are
necessary to explain it within the paradigm. (Camerer 1995) The following
pages deal with anomalies primarily observed in bargaining games. They
reveal that fairness considerations - although neglected by standard game
theory - aﬀect interactions between economic agents.
There are two implications of the standard model of self regarding pref-
erences that are in conﬂict with both laboratory and ﬁeld experiments and
the common intuition that people do care about other people. The ﬁrst is
the implication that agents only care about what they personally gain or lose
and not other agents' gains, losses or intentions. The second implication is
that agents only mind the ﬁnal outcomes of economic interactions and not
about the processes through which these outcomes are attained.
A person exhibits social preferences if the person does not only care about
the economic resources allocated to her but also cares about the economic
resources allocated to relevant reference agents (see Gintis (2005)). Research
indicates that many people exhibit social preferences. Nevertheless there
might as well be a substantial number of people who behave in a purely selﬁsh
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manner as assumed in the theory of self-regarding preferences. Actually
simple maximization of one's own material payoﬀ predicts behavior quite well
in many contexts, for example competitive markets, one-sided auctions with
independent private values, procurement contracting and search. Problems
with standard game theory occur when it comes to ultimatum games, dictator
games, public good games with voluntary contributions and experimental
labor markets (see Cox (2004)). Fairness itself seems to be a concept that
strongly depends on context. What may be considered unfair when two
people meet face to face or in a bilateral manner may be considered fair in a
market context where economic survival is at stake. (Schotter 1995)
1.1 Bargaining Games
One of the most discussed games in the context of social preferences is the
ultimatum game. The ultimatum game is one of the simplest strictly com-
petitive games. It can be described as follows: One player, the proposer or
allocator, is asked to divide a sum of money between himself and a second
player, the recipient. If the recipient accepts the allocator's proposal, both
receive the corresponding amounts of money, but if the recipient rejects the
proposed division, both players receive nothing. In a subgame perfect equi-
librium under standard assumptions allocators keep all for themselves and
propose zero or ε to the recipient, where ε is an inﬁnitesimally small posi-
tive number. The recipient should agree to any positive amount ε since it
is better than nothing. However, experimental evidence shows unambigu-
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ously that this does not correspond to the way people behave in reality. Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) outline the following behavioral regularities observed in
many studies:
• There are virtually no oﬀers above one half of the stake.
• A vast majority of oﬀers lies between 40% and 50% of the total sum of
money.
• There are hardly any oﬀers below 20% of the stake.
• Low oﬀers are frequently rejected. The probability of rejection de-
creases the more generous the proposal is. Proposals of one half are
very seldomly rejected.
A couple of manipulations of the standard setting have been made in order to
decrease the number of equal split oﬀers and the mean proportion allocators
oﬀered. For example in a study recipients were asked to compete in some
kind of skill testing contest and the outcome determined the overall budget to
be divided by the allocator. Other possibilities are the use of market termi-
nology when describing the game or the winning of property rights to be the
proposer. Although most of these manipulations of the standard setting were
successful in the sense of changing players' behavior, they cannot be taken
as a supportive of the standard model, because these extrinsic manipulations
are not accounted for by game theory.
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A similar but even simpler game is the dictator game studied by Forsythe
et al. (1994), Hoﬀman et al. (1996) and others. In the dictator game a ﬁrst
mover, the so-called dictator, divides an amount of money between himself
and player 2. Player 2 can do nothing but accept. The total payoﬀ can be
normalized to 1. If the dictator gives an amount x to the receiver, his own
payoﬀ is 1-x and the receiver's payoﬀ is x. It is obvious that standard game
theory predicts that the dictator will keep all for himself. Empirically, the
following behavioral pattern has been observed:
• There are practically no oﬀers larger than half of the stake.
• Compared to the ultimatum game, oﬀers are low. About 80% of the
oﬀers are between zero and one half. The average positive oﬀer is 24%
of the total pie.
• Roughly 20% of the oﬀers are exactly zero.
In the following paper I will discuss and compare models of inequity aversion
and reciprocity that can (at least partly) account for the observed data.
2 Inequity Aversion
Inequity aversion is a type of social preferences. Two important models
of inequity aversion are those of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000). The basic idea is that inequity averse people wish to achieve
equitable distributions of economic resources. They want to increase other
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persons' payoﬀs when those are below an equitable benchmark and they try
to decrease other persons' payoﬀs as soon as they are above the equitable
level. Inequity aversion is thus a form of conditional altruism.
Fairness judgments are inevitably based on a kind of neutral reference
outcome. The reference outcome that is used to evaluate a given situation
is itself the product of complicated social comparison processes. In social
psychology and sociology the relevance of social comparison has been em-
phasized for a long time. One key insight of this literature is that relative
material payoﬀs aﬀect people's well-being and behavior. (Fehr and Schmidt
1999) The relevance of relative payoﬀs is also supported by lots of research
on labor economics, e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1998) or Clark and
Oswald (1995) amongst others.
In both the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
models agents have a per se aversion to disparities in relative payoﬀs. Beliefs
about the intentions of the other agents are not relevant in these models.
Bolton and Ockenfels assume that people have a symmetric dislike for in-
equality whereas Fehr and Schmidt assume that agents - though still dislik-
ing all inequality - care more about it if it is at their own relative payoﬀ
disadvantage.
2.1 The Fehr and Schmidt model of inequity aversion
Formally, the utility function of player i[1, ..., n] is assumed to be given by
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Ui(x) = xi − αi 1
n− 1
∑
max {xj − xi, 0} − βi 1
n− 1
∑
max {xi − xj, 0}
where x = x1, ...xn denotes the vector of monetary payoﬀs. It is assumed
that βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi < 1. The second term of the expression gives the
utility loss from disadvantageous inequality and the third term measures the
loss from advantageous inequality. βi ≤ αi captures the idea that negative
deviations from the reference outcome hurt more than positive deviations.
βi ≥ 0 means an abstraction of subjects who like to be better oﬀ than others.
βi has to be smaller than 1. Otherwise player i would be willing to throw away
one dollar or even more in order to reduce his one dollar advantage relative
to player j, which seems implausible. If there are more than two players,
each of them compares their income with all other n− 1 players. Therefore
the second and third term have to be normalized by dividing by n − 1 in
order to make sure that the relative impact of inequality aversion on player
i is independent of the number of players. Another implicit assumption is
that player i compares herself with each of the other players, but does not
care about inequalities within the group of other players. (Fehr and Schmidt
1999)
The model is applicable to the ultimatum game and can account quite
well for the deviations from the predictions of standard game theory. The
parameters (α1,β1) represent the allocator's preferences, and (α2,β2) repre-
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sent the responder's preferences. Without loss of generality the bargaining
surplus can be normalized to one where s denotes the responder's share and
1− s the proposer's share. The equilibrium is then characterized as follows:
From the point of the responder it is a dominant strategy to accept any
oﬀer s above 0.5 and to reject s if s < s′(α2)≡ α21+2α2 < 0.5. Any oﬀer s >
s′(α2) should be accepted. If the allocator knows the responder's preferences
she will oﬀer s? = 0.5 if β1 > 0.5, s?[s′(α2), 0.5] if β1 = 0.5 and s? = s′(α2) if
β1 < 0.5. If the proposer does not know exactly the responder's preferences
she believes that α2 is distributed according to a cumulative distribution
function F (α2). F (α2) has support [αl,αu] with 0 ≤ αl <αu <∞. From
the perspective of the allocator, the probability p that an oﬀer below 0.5
will be accepted, is given by p = 1 if s ≥ s′(αu), p = 1 if s ≤ s′(αl)
and p = F ( s
1−2s)(0, 1) if s
′(αl) < s < s′(αu). Thus the optimal oﬀer of
the proposer not knowing the responder's exact preferences is s? = 0.5 if
β1 > 0.5, s?[s′(αu), 0.5] if β1 = 0.5 and s?[s′(αl),s′(αu)] if β1 < 0.5.
Proof 2.1.1 Since s is above 0.5, the responder's utility from accepting is
U2(s) = s−β2(2s− 1). If β2 < 1, this utility is always positive and preferred
to a rejection which yields a payoﬀ of zero. Equality could only be achieved
by destroying the entire surplus which would be very costly for a responder
who is oﬀered more than half of the share. For any oﬀer smaller than a
half, the responder accepts, if this yields a nonnegative utility. That means
U2(s) = s−α2(1 − 2s) > 0. Thus s must exceed the acceptance threshold
s′(α2)≡ α21+2α2 < 0.5. From the perspective of the proposer it does not make
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sense to oﬀer more than half of the share. Doing so would reduce her payoﬀ as
compared with an oﬀer of a half which would also be accepted with certainty
and which would imply perfect equality. If β1 > 0.5, her utility is strictly
increasing in s for all s ≤ 0.5. In this case the allocator rather likes to share
than to maximize her own monetary payoﬀ. She then oﬀers s = 0.5. In case
β1 = 0.5, the proposer is indiﬀerent between keeping one dollar and giving it
to the responder. She is thus indiﬀerent between all oﬀers the responder will
accept up to a half of the share, i.e. s[s′(α2), 0.5]. If β1 < 0.5, the allocator
will increase her monetary payoﬀ even if that makes the responder worse oﬀ.
However, she wants to avoid proposing less than the responder's acceptance
threshold. If she has knowledge of the exact value of the acceptance threshold
she will propose s′(α2). Otherwise she has a believe about the probability of
acceptance, F ( s
1−2s) which is equal to one if s ≥αu(1+2αu) and equal to zero
if s ≤ αl
1+αl
. So in this case there is an optimal oﬀer s[s′(αl), s′(αu)]. (Fehr
and Schmidt 1999)
It is easy to see that there are no oﬀers above 0.5 and that oﬀers equal to
0.5 are always accepted, whereas very low oﬀers are quite likely to be rejected.
The probability of acceptance, F ( s
1−2s), is increasing in s but even relatively
small values of α2 imply relatively large thresholds. The acceptance threshold
is nonlinearly increasing and strictly concave in α2. As α2 goes to inﬁnity,
it converges to 0.5. All those properties of the model go well together with
intuition.
The Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion also accounts well for the
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behavior observed in market and cooperation games. Nevertheless it bears
some weaknesses that I will dicuss in chapters to follow.
2.2 The Bolton and Ockenfels model of inequity aversion
In many cases the Bolton and Ockenfels model (2000) makes equal or similar
predictions to the Fehr and Schmidt model (1999). The fundamental diﬀer-
ence is that Fehr-Schmidt assume that subjects dislike payoﬀ diﬀerences to
any other player, whereas Bolton and Ockenfels assume that subjects want
the average payoﬀ to be as close as possible to their own payoﬀ.
Consider a game with n players, i = 1, ...n. Each player is supposed
to maximize the expected value of his motivation function: νi =νi(yi,σi)
where yi is player i' s monetary payoﬀ and σi is i 's relative share of the
payoﬀ, σi = σi(yi, c) =
yi
c
if c > 0 and σi = 1n if c = 0. c is the total
payout of the game, c =
∑n
i=1 yi. This motivation function captures the
objectives that inﬂuence people's behavior during experimental situations.
The weights individuals give these objectives may well change over the long
term, with changes in age, education, political or religious beliefs, and other
characteristics. However, it is suﬃcient for our purposes that the trade-oﬀ
be stable in the short run, for the duration of the experiment. (Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000)
Several assumptions are made about the motivation function:
• The function νi is continuous and twice diﬀerentiable on the domain of
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(yi,σi). The reason for this assumption is mathematical convenience.
• Narrow self-interest: For a ﬁxed σ and given two choices y1i and y2i with
νi(y
1
i ,σ) = νi(y
2
i ,σ) and y
1
i > y
2
i , player i chooses y
1
i . That means that
for a given relative payoﬀ, players choose consistently with the standard
assumption about preferences for money, i.e. more is better.
• Comparative eﬀect: Holding yi ﬁxed, the motivation function is strictly
concave in σ, with a maximum at the allocation at which one's own
share is equal to the average share.
The equal division is called the social reference point. Players experience a
trade-oﬀ between adhering to the reference point and achieving personal gain.
Diﬀerent individuals react diﬀerently to this tension. Each player has two
thresholds, ri(c) and si(c) that capture at which point individual behavior
diverges from more money is preferred to less. The threshold ri(c) is deﬁned
as follows:
ri(c) = argmaxσiνi(cσi, σi)
where c > 0. Note that yi ≡ cσi(yi, c, n). si(c) is implicitly deﬁned by
νi(csi, si) = νi(0,
1
n
)
where c > 0 and si ≤ 1n . Technically, both expressions are functions of n.
For the two player case ri corresponds to the division that player i would
choose in a dictator game and si to i 's rejection threshold in the ultimatum
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game. The above assumptions imply that there is a unique si(0, 1n ] and a
ri[
1
n
, 1] for every c.
• Heterogeneity: The full range of thresholds is represented in the player
population.
An example motivation function for player i in a two-player game is:
νi(yi, σi) = aiyi − bi
2
(
σi − 1
2
)2
with ai ≥ 0 and bi > 0. The ﬁrst term catches the preferences for the
monetary payoﬀ itself. The second term shows the inﬂuence of the compar-
ative eﬀect. The further the allocation moves away from giving player i an
equal share, the higher the loss in his or her utility. The ratio of weights
that is attributed to the absolute and relative components of the motivation
function, a
b
, can be used to characterize a player's type. Strict relativism is
represented by a
b
= 0 and implies that r = s = 1
2
. Strict narrow self-interest
is represented by a
b
→∞ and implies that r = 1 and s→ 0.
Stable patterns of behavior can be characterized by equilibrium predic-
tions. An equilibrium in this model is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium solved
with respect to motivation functions. Players' r and s thresholds are private
information but the densities f r and f s with which they are distributed are
common knowledge.
Reconsider the ultimatum game. (P) denotes the proposer, (R) the re-
sponder and (c, σp) denotes the proposal to the responder. The proposer's
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payoﬀ is then cσp and so the responder's payoﬀ is given by c − cσp. If a
responder is indiﬀerent to both accepting and rejecting, 1− σp = sR(c), she
is assumed to always accept the oﬀer. The equilibrium then has the following
properties:
• Responder behavior: For any c > 0, the probability that a randomly
selected responder will reject the proposal, p(c, σp), satisﬁes:
1. p(c, 1
2
) = 0 and p(c, 1) = 1. By the assumption of narrow self-interest,
it is clear that νR( c2 ,
1
2
) ≥ νR(0,12). Thus an equal division is never re-
jected. By deﬁnition an oﬀer is rejected, if 1−σp < sR(c) for sR(c)(0,12 ].
Therefore σp = 1oﬀers will always be rejected.
2. p is strictly increasing in σp over the interval (12 , 1). This follows from
integrating over the density f s.
3. ﬁxing a σp(12 , 1), p is nonincreasing in c.
• Proposer behavior: For all ultimatum proposals it holds that 1
2
≤ σp <
1: For any c proposers prefer σp = 12 to any σp <
1
2
and they know that
σp =
1
2
is never rejected. It is therefore obvious that in equilibrium
σp ≥ 12 . σp = 1 is always rejected by responders so that in equilibrium
σp < 1.
The above predictions are in line with experimental observations in ultima-
tum game situations. As the Fehr and Schmidt model the Bolton and Ock-
enfels model is also insightful when applying it to market games, dilemma
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games and the gift-exchange game. However, it has its limitations. ERC is a
theory of local behavior in the sense that it explains stationary patterns for
relatively simple games, played over a short time span in a constant frame.
(Bolton and Ockenfels 2000)
2.3 Reference points and maximization of expected utility
A common concept in psychology and sociology is that of a reference level
(of e.g. income), against which an individual compares herself or himself. A
study of Clark and Oswald (1995) points out that workers' reported levels
of well-being are only weakly correlated with absolute income. Their self-
reported levels of satisfaction are inversely related to their comparison wage
rates. It seems likely that judgements about fairness also rest on some kind
of comparative process. Taking a reference point or reference transaction as
a basis for fairness judgements is not necessarily just in itself but it seems
natural from a psychological point of view.
People are often more sensitive to how their current situation diﬀers from
some reference level than to the absolute characteristics of the situation.
Loss aversion seems to play an important role in people's notion of fairness.
For example, most employees feel that a ﬁrm is more obliged not to hurt
them relative to a reference level than it is obliged to improve terms of trade
if doing so is possible. (Rabin 1998) Moreover, perceptions about what is
considered fair, seem to adjust over time. Something that was perceived as
unfair in the ﬁrst place, might become a reference transaction once people
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get used to it. Psychological studies of adaptation suggest that any stable
state of aﬀairs tends to become accepted eventually, at least in the sense that
alternatives to it no longer readily come to mind. (Kahnemann 1986)
When looking at bargaining games we ﬁnd that people seem to implicitly
consider equitable sharing over changes in total payoﬀ (and not total payoﬀ
itself). A responder being oﬀered 10% of the total pie in an ultimatum game
does not consider the situation before the game started as his reference level.
If this were the case he should gladly accept since even a small amount of
money is an improvement relative to getting nothing. However, the respon-
der's reference outcome is not zero but the other player's share. From this
point of view, getting only 10% of the total payoﬀ is disadvantageous. In
two-player games it is trivial to determine the relevant reference group, i.e.
the other player. In an ultimatum game it is more or less obvious that the
reference point is equity. But in more complex social interactions it is often
not clear who is part of the reference group and who is not and what the
reference outcome looks like. The determination of the relevant reference
group and the relevant reference outcome for a given class of games is ulti-
mately an empirical question. The social context, the saliency of particular
agents, and the social proximity among individuals are all likely to inﬂuence
reference groups and outcomes. (Fehr and Schmidt 1999)
Another problem, apart from the determination of reference groups and
outcomes in complex environments, is the motivation of the proposer in e.g an
ultimatum game. Some researchers have suggested that allocators in ultima-
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tum games might not truly be motivated to be fair but rather to appear fair.
When anticipating that responders might reject low oﬀers, proposers maxi-
mize their expected payoﬀ by oﬀering a more generous share. Experiments
in which the proposer had to distribute a number of chips of diﬀerent value
to himself and the responder, show that the proposer's main motivation is to
appear fair. A study that points into this direction is that of Kagel, Kim and
Moser (1996). They analyzed behavior in ultimatum games with asymmetric
information where chips with diﬀerent valuation for the proposer and the re-
sponder had to be distributed. In the case where the proposer knows that a
chip is worth 30 cents to himself and only 10 cents to the responder, an equal
division would imply giving 75% of the chips to the responder. However, if
the proposer knows that the responder is not aware of the diﬀerent valuations
of the chips, he might oﬀer only 50% of the chips. This is enough to appear
fair in front of the unaware responder and at the same time gives himself a
higher payoﬀ. Empirical data reveals that oﬀers made in this treatment are
actually close to 50% and rejections are rare. This suggests that proposers
might act like sophisticated proﬁt maximizers who only try to appear fair
in order to prevent rejections. A study by Suleiman (1996), who conducted
so-called δ-ultimatum games, came to similar ﬁndings.
Nevertheless, evidence from other games (e.g. the dictator game) suggests
that it is not justiﬁed to conclude that positive allocations are only due to
the fear of rejection. It is likely that various factors aﬀect the importance of
strategic and normative motivation and regardless of the proposer, it is un-
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ambiguously true that the responder exhibits some kind of social preferences.
See Dijk (2000) for further details.
2.4 Comparing models of inequality aversion
The diﬀerence between the two inequity aversion models by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) lies in the diﬀerent inequality mea-
sures represented in the utility functions. Bolton and Ockenfels assume that
it is the diﬀerence between the average payoﬀ and individual payoﬀs that
people care about. On the other hand, Fehr and Schmidt propose that peo-
ple dislike payoﬀ diﬀerences between them and any other player. According
to Bolton and Ockenfels, in a population where some people are very rich
and some are very poor, a player i receiving exactly the average material
payoﬀ should be as happy as if he was in a population where everyone gets
the same payoﬀ. The Fehr-Schmidt model predicts that player i prefers the
second case where everyone gets the same.
Engelmann and Strobel (2002) try to compare the relative performances
of the two inequality aversion models. Moreover, they aim to compare the
relative importance of inequality aversion with concerns for eﬃciency and
maximin preferences. In the case of the following distribution experiments
eﬃciency means the sum of payoﬀs. Maximin preferences express the wish
to maximize the minimal payoﬀ in the group. (For the relevance of maximin
preferences versus eﬃciency concerns see also Rabin (1998)).
Since only actions can be observed, it is often not easy or even not possible
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for an observer to infer what the underlying motivation has been.
Consider the following example:
allocation A B
Player 1 5 4
Player 2 3 4
Player 3 1 4
Total 9 12
If it is observed that allocation B is chosen, a dislike of inequality could
have been the motivation. But it could also be that B was chosen, because
it is more eﬃcient, which means that the total payoﬀ of all subjects is max-
imized. A third possibility consistent with the choice of B is that the player
has maximin preferences. In the experiments run by Engelmann and Strobel
they tried to disentangle these diﬀerent motivations to allow for a compar-
ison of their relative importance. Simple distribution games were used in
order to exclude any concern of reciprocity (which will later be discussed in
detail). There were thirteen experimental treatments conducted in three ses-
sions with in total 586 participants recruited from an introductory economics
class. Each participant was asked to choose from three diﬀerent allocations
of money between three persons. They were told that later on they would
randomly form groups of three where the three roles would also be assigned
randomly. Only the choice of the participant selected as person two mattered
for the distribution of real payoﬀs. Average payoﬀs of persons 1 and 3 as well
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as the total payoﬀ for each allocation were noted in the decision sheets. Note
that person two could not inﬂuence his or her own payoﬀ.
In the so-called taxation game there is a poor-, a middle- and an upper-
class. The FS-model (Fehr-Schmidt) predicts the middle-class would like to
tax the upper-class in order to help the poor. According to ERC (Bolton-
Ockenfels) someone in the middle-class should be happy with the situation
as it is. In the corresponding experiment the decision maker gets an inter-
mediate payoﬀ and the possibility to redistribute payoﬀ from person 1 (who
gets the highest payoﬀ) to person 3 (who receives the lowest payoﬀ). The
crucial point in the diﬀerent treatments E and F (and control treatments Ex
and Fx where ﬁxed roles were assigned in advance) is that the allocation that
minimizes the diﬀerence between the payoﬀs of the decision makers and each
of the other players at the same time maximizes the diﬀerence between the
payoﬀ of the decision maker and the average payoﬀ and vice versa. Therefore
FS and ERC predict choices of allocations that are at the opposite ends of
the choice set. The decision maker's choice had diﬀerent eﬀects on the total
payoﬀs depending on the treatment. In treatments F and Fx the allocation
that is predicted by the Fehr-Schmidt model is also eﬃcient. In treatments
E and Ex the predicted allocation by Bolton and Ockenfels maximizes total
payoﬀ. The intermediate allocation should never be chosen as it is not in
line with either ERC, FS, eﬃciency or maximin preferences. In all taxation
games the predictions of the FS-model are the same as predictions of a model
including only maximin preferences. This is due to the fact that FS can only
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be contrary to maximin preferences if increasing the diﬀerence to the low-
est payoﬀ is compensated by reducing payoﬀ diﬀerences that are larger or
disadvantageous. The same is not true for ERC.
Treatment F E Fx Ex
Allocation A, B, C A, B, C A, B, C A, B, C
Person 1 8.2, 8.8, 9.4 9.4, 8.4, 7.4 17, 18, 19 21, 17, 13
Person 2 5.6, 5.6, 5.6 6.4, 6.4, 6.4 10, 10, 10 12, 12, 12
Person 3 4.6, 3.6, 2.6 2.6, 3.2, 3.8 9, 5, 1 3, 4, 5
Total 18.4, 18, 17.6 18.4, 18, 17.6 36, 33, 30 36, 33, 30
Eﬃcient A A A A
Maximin A C A C
ERC pred. C A C A
FS pred. A C A C
Choices (abs.) 57, 7, 4 27, 16, 25 26, 2, 2 12, 5, 13
Choices (%) 83.8, 10.3, 5.9 39.7, 23.5, 36.7 86.7, 6.7, 6.7 40, 16.7, 43.3
Engelmann and Strobel (2002)
For treatment F the results are unambiguous. More than 83% of the
decision makers chose an allocation that is consistent with the prediction
of the Fehr-Schmidt model and that maximizes total utility. Almost 6%
chose the allocation predicted by ERC and more than 10% stayed with the
21
intermediate allocation. In treatment E the results are not so clear. Almost
40% chose the allocation in line with ERC and eﬃciency, 36.7% chose the
allocation predicted by FS and maximin preferences and 23.5% preferred the
intermediate allocation. Statistical testing shows that the hypothesis that
all three allocations are chosen with equal probability cannot be rejected. In
total 136 choices were made in both treatments. 61.8% of them maximized
total payoﬀs, whereas 21.3% minimized them. As opposed to the assumption
by both ERC and FS that eﬃciency does not matter, a clear inﬂuence of
eﬃciency is revealed by the experimental results. When subjects were asked
to explain their motivation in treatment E and F, 18 stated they had been
motivated by ideas of fairness. 17 of them made their choice according to
the FS-model, including 8 participants who also referred to the maximal
total payoﬀ. Only one subject stated his or her concern for relative payoﬀs,
but contrary to predictions in the sense that he or she wanted to maximize
his/her own share. In the treatments Ex and Fx all of the 15 participants
who aﬃrmed they were caring for fairness chose the allocation in line with
Fehr-Schmidt. Eﬃciency was mentioned by 16 subjects as their motivation
and 6 indicated maximin preferences. As a conclusion, one can say that in
the taxation game the Fehr-Schmidt model performs much better than the
Bolton-Ockenfels model and that eﬃciency inﬂuences decisions.
As a test for the robustness of results and also as a more severe test
for the inequality aversion models the so-called envy game was performed.
In this game the payoﬀ of person 2 is again intermediate. The FS-model
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predicts a choice of C, which is pareto-dominated by choice B predicted by
Bolton-Ockenfels. B is in turn pareto-dominated by allocation A. In diﬀerent
treatments of the game the payoﬀ of the decision maker (player 2) varied in
order to test whether participants were willing to give up their own payoﬀ to
reduce inequality or to increase eﬃciency.
Treatment Envy Game
Allocation A B C
Person 1 16 13 10
Person 2 8 8 8
Person 3 5 3 1
Eﬃcient A
Maximin A
ERC pred. B
FS pred. C
Choices (abs.) 21 8 1
Choices (%) 70 26.7 3.3
Engelmann and Strobel (2002)
70% of participants chose the pareto-eﬃcient allocation. 26.7% made
their decision in line with predictions of ERC and only 3.3% of the subjects
chose the allocation predicted by FS. In this case the Bolton-Ockenfels model
in combination with pareto-dominance clearly outperforms the Fehr-Schmidt
23
model. Results from control treatments with varying payoﬀs of the decision
maker indicate that although there are minor eﬀects on the choices made, the
relative importance of the diﬀerent motives does not change signiﬁcantly. In
face of pareto-dominance the ERC performs - although not very well - bet-
ter than the FS-model. However, the predictive power of the Fehr-Schmidt
model could be increased by abstracting from the linear form tolerating that
the model is not neutral to scaling. Then it could also explain choices of B.
Also the restriction β ≤ α could be relaxed, so that even choices of A could
be consistent with FS. In general, eﬃciency seems to be a major factor for
preferences over distributions, but cannot account for all choices observed.
The last game studied is the rich and poor game in which the decision
maker receives either the highest or the lowest payoﬀ. FS and ERC predict
the same choice in this game, i.e. allocation A in treatment R and allocation
C in treatment P. In treatment R the decision maker receives the highest
payoﬀ. He can choose for the other subjects' payoﬀs to be relatively equal
(C) or to be maximal in total (A). Maximin preferences predict that C is
chosen. Inequality aversion models predict that the eﬃcient allocation A is
chosen. In treatment P the decision maker gets the lowest payoﬀ. Inequality
aversion predicts the least eﬃcient allocation C. In this treatment maximin
preferences cannot play a role. Therefore it allows to contrast eﬃciency and
inequality aversion without a possible inﬂuence of maximin preferences.
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Treatment R P
Allocation A B C A B C
Person 1 11 8 5 14 11 8
Person 2 12 12 12 4 4 4
Person 3 2 3 4 5 6 7
Total 25 23 21 23 21 19
Eﬃcient A A
Maximin C A, B or C
ERC pred. A C
FS pred. A C
Choices (abs.) 8 6 16 18 2 10
Choices (%) 26.7 20 53.3 60 6.7 33.3
Engelmann and Strobel (2002)
The results are surprising. The experiments discussed earlier indicate
that both eﬃciency and inequality aversion are important factors. But in
treatment R where both inequality aversion models predict the eﬃcient al-
location A, only 26.7% actually chose A. 53.3% chose allocation C. On the
other hand, in treatment P where inequality aversion predicts C, 60% of
the subjects cared for eﬃciency and chose A. So more subjects prefer the
eﬃcient allocation when it does not minimize inequality than when it does.
The crucial diﬀerence between treatments R and P are maximin preferences.
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In treatment P the minimal payoﬀ is constant, whereas in treatment R the
minimal payoﬀ is maximized in allocation C. Consequently, it is very likely
that maximin preferences play an important role. However, in treatment P
where maximin preferences do not predict anything, a third of the subjects
do care about inequality aversion.
In order to better evaluate the relative importance of the diﬀerent motives
Engelmann and Strobel pooled the data and estimated a conditional logit
model. Explanatory variables are as follows (for every allocation j{A,B,C}
that person i can choose from):
Effij =
∑3
k=1 xjk eﬃciency
MMij = min{xjk, k = 1, 2, 3} minimax
Selfij = xj2 selﬁshness
FSαij = −12
∑
k 6=2max{xjk − xj2, 0} Fehr-Schmidt
FSβij = −12
∑
max{xj2 − xjk, 0} Fehr-Schmidt
ERCij = −100 | 13 − xj2Effij | Bolton-Ockenfels
These variables were used to estimate the conditional logit model:
Vij = γ1Effij + γ2MMij + γ3Selfij + γ4FSαij + γ5FSβij + γ6ERCij
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xjk is the payoﬀ of person k in allocation j. The probability that person i
chooses allocation j is given by
P ij =
exp(Vij)∑
g{A,B,C} exp(Vig)
Neither component of the Fehr-Schmidt model has signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the chosen allocations. The ERC motive has a negative and marginally sig-
niﬁcant inﬂuence. Both eﬃciency and even more maximin preferences have
a signiﬁcant impact. A combination of eﬃciency concerns, maximin prefer-
ences and selﬁshness are suﬃcient to explain the data. FS and ERC together
can only add marginally to the explained variance. As soon as the max-
imin component is excluded, FS gets highly positively signiﬁcant and ERC
has a signiﬁcant negative impact. Without controlling for maximin prefer-
ences the Fehr-Schmidt model appears to be much more accurate than the
Bolton-Ockenfels model, but if maximin preferences are considered as well,
the advantage of the FS-model disappears. It seems the Fehr-Schmidt model
owes its success mostly to the fact that it is in line with maximin preferences
per construction. Also experiments by Charness and Rabin (2001) and Char-
ness and Grosskopf (2001) ﬁnd little evidence for inequality aversion, but a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence of quasi-maximin preferences. On the other hand, the
evident absence of strategic interaction in the discussed experiments might
possibly change the importance of diﬀerent distributional motives. Which
motives are most inﬂuential seems to partly depend on the structure of the
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game. Inequality aversion seems to play a more important role in bargaining,
trust or public good games. For a deeper discussion see Engelmann (2004).
In response to the study of Engelmann and Strobel, Fehr et al. (2006) ar-
gue that other subjects than economics students value eﬃciency far less than
equality. Therefore the results of the experiments run by Engelmann and
Strobel might be biased. Indeed, a study repeating the same experiments
with two subject pools - one group of economics and business administration
students, one group of students of other ﬁelds - indicates that there are major
diﬀerences between subject groups. In treatment Ey more than 66% of the
subjects with a background of economics chose the eﬃcient but most inegali-
tarian allocation A. From the other, non-economist group only 25% opted for
A, whereas almost 58% chose the ineﬃcient but most egalitarian allocation
C. The diﬀerence between the two groups is statistically highly signiﬁcant.
This raises the question of whether there are other subject pool characteris-
tics such as gender, age or political preferences that might inﬂuence results.
In order to test for these potential eﬀects, information was collected from
the subjects after they had taken their choices in the experiments. It turned
out that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between choices of non-economics
students and employees without college education. Political attitudes, age
and membership in organizations do not have signiﬁcant eﬀects either. The
gender variable is weakly signiﬁcant. If all data is pooled, the overall impact
of an economists' and a gender dummy can be estimated. Economists are
25% less likely to choose the egalitarian but ineﬃcient allocation C. Women
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are 9% more likely to choose C. Thus Fehr concludes that indeed a majority
of people have preferences for equity in simple distribution games and only
a minority of subjects are more concerned about eﬃciency.
Another point to mention is that even in treatment P of Engelmann and
Strobel, one third of the participants chose the most ineﬃcient and most
egalitarian allocation. This suggests that a third of the subjects actually are
inequality averse. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argue that in strategic interac-
tions the heterogeneity of social preferences is crucial. Even a minority of
inequality averse subjects can have a great impact in some economic envi-
ronments.
A diﬀerent test of equity based models is their application to three-person
ultimatum games. In three-person ultimatum games, player A proposes a
distribution of money between herself and players B and C. Either B or C is
chosen at random and can accept or reject the oﬀer. If the responder accepts,
the distribution is implemented as proposed. If the responder rejects, he and
the proposer get nothing, but the non-responder receives a positive payoﬀ,
the so-called consolation prize. As soon as the consolation prize is suﬃciently
large, both models of inequality aversion predict that all positive oﬀers should
be accepted. A rejection implies not only giving up one's own payoﬀ but also
generating income inequality between oneself (the responder) and the non-
responding player. In an experiment conducted by Kagel and Wolfe (2001)
the consolation prize took on values of $0,$1,$3 and $12 where player A had
to distribute $15. The Fehr and Schmidt model predicts that there should
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be no rejections if the consolation prize is $12. The Bolton and Ockenfels
model predicts the same for all consolation prizes greater than zero.
In the experiment there were four sessions - one for each consolation prize.
In each session 30 subjects played in ten rounds, where responder and pro-
poser pairings were rotated after every round. Rejection rates varied between
15% to 22% when there were positive consolation prizes. If the consolation
prize was zero, 21% of the responders rejected. Under the $12 consolation
prize treatment a rejection rate of 20.2% was observed proving not only the
Bolton-Ockenfels but also the Fehr-Schmidt prediction empirically wrong.
However, this test is very stringent and does not allow for any mistakes of
players. For the models to be qualitatively consistent with experimental
observations it would be suﬃcient if they were right in the prediction that
the larger the consolation prize, the more likely players accept. Statistical
testing reveals that there are marginally more acceptances in the positive
consolation prize treatments, other things being equal. But the probabil-
ity of acceptance does not increase monotonically with the amount of the
consolation prize and its increase is not robust. Proposer behavior did not
signiﬁcantly diﬀer among treatments. Most proposers made equal oﬀers to
players B and C and the median oﬀer was ($7,$4,$4). Even in the $12 con-
solation prize treatment proposers did not take advantage of the potential
protection from a responder inequality aversion. In a control treatment a
negative consolation prize was introduced. All subjects received a starting
capital and when an oﬀer was rejected, the non-responder lost money. Re-
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sponder behavior only changed slightly in this situation.
All in all, both models of inequality aversion do not organize the data very
well in three-person ultimatum games. There are two possible explanations
for the responders' ignoring of the third player. First, he might perceive the
non-responder as not being part of the relevant reference group. This would
be a quite dissatisfying conclusion as the need for ad hoc speciﬁcations of
the relevant reference group for each setting means a serious constraint of
the models' power. The other explanation is that intentionality matters and
an inequality resulting from an intentional action is perceived and treated
diﬀerently from an unintentional inequality. See Kagel and Wolfe (2001) for
further details.
2.5 Relevance of intentions and causal attributions
The psychology literature strongly suggests that people often consider con-
text and interpersonal history when determining their actions in social ex-
change situations. (Charness 2004)
A fundamental assumption across all attribution theory models is that
individuals have a need to infer causes and to assign responsibility for why
outcomes occur. [...] When assigning responsibility, people assess the degree
to which the causal agent is perceived to have knowingly or unknowingly
contributed to the outcome. When outcomes are unfavorable and perceptions
of intention are high, there is a tendency to assign blame. [...] Within a
social utility framework, the occurrence of aggression could be expected to
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lead to a heightened concern for comparative payoﬀs and a reduced concern
for absolute payoﬀs. (Blount 1995)
Both models of inequity aversion ignore the role of infered intentions
for individuals' behavior. They proceed from the assumption that people
compare only relative payoﬀs to judge whether they have been treated fairly.
This concept is called outcome fairness in contrast to contextual fairness.
In many situations outcome fairness by itself cannnot suﬃciently explain
why people behave the way they do. To clarify the importance of intentions
many experiments have been made. Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) and
Nelson (2002) have shown that identical oﬀers in an ultimatum game lead to
diﬀerent rejection rates, depending on the alternatives that were available to
the proposer.
In the study of Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) four so-called mini-
ultimatum games were conducted. A mini-ultimatum game has the same
structure as the ultimatum game with the only diﬀerence that the proposer
cannot freely choose how much to oﬀer but has the choice between only
two allocations. In the experiment the allocation x stayed the same and the
alternative allocation y diﬀered from game to game. The allocation x = (8/2)
implies that if the responder accepts, he gets 2 points and the proposer gets
8 points. In game A the alternative oﬀer y is (5/5), in game B it is (2/8), in
game C there is no alternative at all and in game D the alternative is (10/0).
There were 90 experimental subjects that all participated in each game. Each
responder was asked to decide on his reaction for both the x and the y case
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without knowing in advance what the proposer's action had been. Thus
responders had to specify complete strategies in the game-theoretic sense.
Subjects were randomly assigned the proposer or responder role. They faced
the four games in varying order and played against a diﬀerent anonymous
opponent in each game. Outcomes were only announced after all four games
had been completed. This approach had the advantages that income eﬀects
could be avoided and that subjects' behavior was not inﬂuenced by previous
decisions of their opponents.
The standard game-theoretic model with selfregarding preferences pre-
dicts that x oﬀers are never rejected throughout all of the four settings. The
Bolton-Ockenfels and Fehr-Schmidt models of inequity aversion are consis-
tent with positive rejection rates but predict that the rejection rate of the
(8/2) oﬀer is the same for all games. Intuitively most people would expect
that responder behavior does diﬀer according to the setting they are in, and
this was conﬁrmed by the experimental data. Whether the x oﬀer was quali-
ﬁed as acceptable, depended on whether the responder would have been free
to chose a more equal distribution or not. In the (5/5)-game rejection rates
were highest (44%) indicating that many people ﬁnd it oﬀensive not to be of-
fered an equal share. The rejection rate was lower in the (2/8)-game (26,7%).
Oﬀering (8/2) now was probably still perceived as unfair but less so than in
the (5/5)-game because the only alternative would have been another unfair
distribution and from the fact that the proposer did not want to be unfair to
herself one could not conclude that she meant to be unfair to the responder.
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In the (8/2)-game the rejection rate was only 18%. In this game the pro-
poser did not have any choice and so from the outcome the responder could
not infer any potentially good or bad intentions. Therefore this rejection
rate measures pure inequality aversion. In the last game, the (10/0)-game,
the rejection rate is the lowest (8,9%). It is even lower than pure inequality
aversion since oﬀering (8/2) in this game might even be thought to be a fair
or kind action.
Various statistical tests (non-parametric Cochran Q-test, pair-wise com-
parisons, non-parametric McNemar test) conﬁrm that the diﬀerences in re-
jection rates across all games are signiﬁcant and results are robust.
From the proposer's point of view the expected return from the (8/2)-oﬀer
varies across games. It was least proﬁtable to propose (8/2) in the (5/5)-game
and most proﬁtable in the (10/0)-game. A majority of the proposers made
the payoﬀ-maximizing choice in each game, which was (5/5) in the (5/5)-
game and (8/2) in the (2/8)- and (10/0)-games. It remains an open question
whether proposers actually cared for fairness or just tried to maximize their
payoﬀs anticipating their responders' behavior. For further discussion see
Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003).
However, the results suggest that pure inequity aversion does play some
role, but the diﬀerences in rejection rates reveal that it does not tell the
whole story. Similar results were provided by the experiments of Blount
(1995), Brandts and Solà (2001), Güth et al. (2001) and Oﬀerman (2002).
Blount found in her experiments that people react very diﬀerently to ac-
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tions, depending on whether they believe those were taken by humans or
by non-human devices. When agents are human, people develop norma-
tive expectations about how these agents should behave and they experience
disutility if their expectations are not met.
As a consequence, fairness models should not only take into account that
many people care for the distribution of payoﬀs. People also try to infer
and value fairness intentions behind actions. Reciprocity based models are
models that try to capture this idea.
3 Reciprocity
[...] Reciprocity is a behavioral response to perceived kindness and unkind-
ness where kindness comprises both distributional fairness as well as fairness
intentions. (Falk 2006) Unlike inequity aversion models reciprocity based
models assume that people's evaluation of the kindness or fairness of an action
does not only depend on its consequences but also on the actor's underlying
intentions.
3.1 Rabin's model of reciprocity
Rabin (1993) developed a game-theoretic framework for incorporating the
idea of reciprocity into economic models. Let us start from the following
considerations: People are willing to sacriﬁce their own material well-being
to help those who are being kind and to punish those who are being un-
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kind. Both motivations have a greater eﬀect on behavior the smaller the cost
of sacriﬁcing becomes. Outcomes that reﬂect these motivations are called
fairness equilibria.
In the following model, payoﬀs depend on players' actions and on their
beliefs. Whether a person's actions are kind or unkind depends on what she
thinks the consequences of her actions will be. In other words, a player's
kindness depends on her intentions. If the other player wants to reciprocate,
he must form beliefs about the ﬁrst player's intentions. Intentions also de-
pend on beliefs. It follows that reciprocal motivation can only arise with
beliefs about beliefs. Games in which payoﬀs also depend on players' be-
liefs about other player's strategic choices or beliefs are called psychological
games.
Rabin's model of reciprocity is applicable to all two-person, ﬁnite-strategy
normalform-games. Assume that in a two-player (i=1,2) normal form game
with (mixed) strategy sets S1 and S2 derived from the ﬁnite pure strategy
sets A1 and A2 material payoﬀs are pii : S1xS2 → R. From this material
game the psychological game is constructed. Each player's subjective ex-
pected utility when choosing her strategy depends on (1) her strategy, (2) her
beliefs concerning the strategy the other player will choose, and (3) her beliefs
about the other player's beliefs concerning her own strategy. The strategies
chosen by the players are represented in the following model as a1S1 and
a2S2. b1S1 and b2S2 represent player 2's beliefs about the strategy player
1 is choosing and player 1's beliefs about the strategy player 2 is choosing.
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c1S1 and c2S2 are player 1's beliefs about what player 2 believes player
1's strategy is, and player 2's beliefs about what player 1 believes player 2's
strategy is. f i(ai,bj) deﬁnes a kindness function measuring how kind player
i is to player j. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the kindness
function is the same for both players, which means that they have the same
notion of kindness or fairness. Player i tries to infer the other's kindness by
evaluating the payoﬀ combination j 's choice has induced. The set of all feasi-
ble payoﬀs is Π(bj)≡ {(pii(a,bj),pij(bj, a)) | aSi}. Player i chooses a strategy
that yields payoﬀs (pii(ai,bj),pij(bj,ai)) given player j chooses bj. pihj (bj) de-
notes the highest payoﬀ in the set of all feasible payoﬀs for player j. pilj(bj) is
the lowest payoﬀ among all pareto-eﬃcient points in Π(bj) for player j. From
these two points one can derive an equitable payoﬀ
piej (bj) =
1
2
[pihj (bj) + pi
l
j(bj)]
This is a rough reference point which shows how fair or kind player i is
towards player j. piminj (bj) is the worst possible payoﬀ for player j in the set
Π(bj). The kindness function can then be deﬁned as
f i(ai, bj) ≡
pij(bj, ai)− piej (bj)
pihj (bj)− piminj (bj)
It measures how much more or less than her opponent's equitable payoﬀ
player i believes she is giving to player j. If player i gives player j her
equitable payoﬀ the kindness function takes a value of zero. If she gives her
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less than the equitable payoﬀ, the kindness function takes a value below zero.
f i can be negative for two reasons: either player i takes more than her equal
share on the Pareto frontier of Π(bj) or she chooses an ineﬃcient point in
Π(bj).
The formally equivalent function f ◦j (bj,ci)≡ pii(ci,bj)−pi
e
i (cj)
pihi (ci)−pimini (ci)
gives player i 's
belief about how fair player j treats her.
Since both f ◦j(·) and f i(·) are normalized, their values always lie between
-1 and 1
2
and they are not sensitive to positive aﬃne transformations of
the material payoﬀs. Players' preferences can now be speciﬁed by using
the kindness functions. Every player chooses ai in order to maximize her
expected utility U i(ai,bj,ci). The utility function captures material utility as
well as utility gained from perceived fairness intentions:
U i(ai, bj, ci) ≡ pii(ai, bj) + f ◦j (bj, ci) · [1 + fi(ai, bj)]
The idea of reciprocity is realised as follows: If player i believes that player j
is unfair to her, which means that f ◦j(·) is negative, she wants to be unkind
to her opponent by choosing ai so that f i(·) is low or negative. On the other
side if player j acts kindly so that f ◦j(·) is positive, player i will also wish to
be kind to player j. Despite of the reciprocity eﬀect, players of course also
value pure material well-being and thus have to trade oﬀ their preference for
fairness against their material interests. In this context a notable property of
Rabin's model should be considered: The behavior in these games is sensitive
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to the scale of material payoﬀs. The bigger they are, the less player's behavior
will reﬂect their concern for fairness. This is due to the fact that kindness
functions are bounded. Whether this is a desirable property or a weakness
of the model is not completely clear. On the one hand it is intuitive to
assume that people only care for fairness when there is not much at stake
and turn more selﬁsh when high payoﬀs can be obtained. On the other hand
experiments with varying stakes in ultimatum games have shown that even
in high-stakes treatments proposers do not oﬀer less (see Camerer and Thaler
(1995)).
The solution concept used in these games is what Rabin calls fairness
equilibrium. Fairness equilibria are similar to Nash equilibria for psychologi-
cal games. An additional condition that must be met is that all higher-order
beliefs have to match actual behavior. Fairness equilibria neither constitute
a subset nor a superset of Nash equilibria. In other words, the concept of
fairness equilibria can add new predictions to economic models as well as
eliminate conventional predictions.
A fairness equilibrium is a pair of strategies (a1,a2)(S1,S2) for i = 1,2,
j 6= i with aiargmaxaSiUi(ai,bj,ci) and ai = bi = ci.
In order to simplify the analysis of properties of fairness equilibria more
notation has to be introduced.
• A mutual-max outcome is a strategy pair (a1,a2)(S1,S2) for i = 1,2,i 6=
j and aiargmaxaSipij(a,aj).
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• A mutual-min outcome is a strategy pair (a1,a2)(S1,S2) for i = 1,2,i 6=
j and aiargminaSipij(a,aj).
• An outcome is strictly positive if, for i=1,2, f i > 0. If f i ≥ 0 an
outcome is called weakly positive. Analogously an outcome is strictly
negative if, for i=1,2, f i < 0 and weakly negative if f i ≤ 0. If f i = 0 an
outcome is called neutral and an outcome is called mixed if, for i=1,2,
f i,f j < 0.
The following propositions hold for all games, irrespective of the scale of
material payoﬀs.
A) If (a1,a2) is a Nash equilibrium and either a mutual-max or mutual-
min outcome, (a1,a2) is also a fairness equilibrium.
Proof 3.1.1 (a1,a2) being a Nash equilibrium means that both players are
maximizing their material payoﬀs. If (a1,a2) is a mutual-max outcome f 1
and f 2 are both nonnegative, which means that both players wish to be kind
to another. Each player chooses a strategy that maximizes her own material
payoﬀ as well as her opponent's material well-being. Thus each player max-
imizes her overall utility. In the other case where (a1,a2) is a mutual-min
outcome implying that f1 and f 2 are nonpositive, both players want to de-
crease their opponent's material payoﬀ. While doing so, they simultaneously
maximize their own material well-being and therefore maximize their overall
utility.
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B) All fairness equilibria outcomes are strictly positive or weakly
negative. This means that in a fairness equilibrium it will never
be the case that one person is kind while at the same time the
other is unkind.
Proof 3.1.2 Suppose there was an outcome with f i > 0 and f j ≤ 0. f i > 0
implies that player i could increase her payoﬀ by maximizing her own ma-
terial interest. Doing so would at the same time harm player j. If f j ≤ 0
utility maximization requires player i to do so even at the expense of player
j. Therefore the outcome cannot be a fairness equilibrium.
Roughly speaking, it can be asserted that in games with very small ma-
terial payoﬀs fairness equilibria correspond to Nash equilibria in situations
where each player tries to either maximize or minimize the other player's pay-
oﬀ. In games with very large payoﬀs fairness plays relatively less role. In this
case Nash equilibria are fairness equilibria, too, except for some non-strict
Nash equilibria.
There is an asymmetry inherent in the model. In every game there exists
a weakly negative fairness equilibrium but not necessarily a positive one.
The intuition behind this is the following: When a player maximizes his
own material payoﬀ, he is either mean or neutral to the other player. Being
kind involves sacriﬁcing own material well-being. There are situations where
material self-interest gives people an incentive to be mean even when other
players are kind, but on the other hand material self-interest will never be a
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motivation to be kind when other players are being unfair. Insofar negative
feelings have more inﬂuence on outcomes than positive feelings.
A weakness of Rabin's model is that it is only applicable to two-person,
normal form, complete information games. Moreover, Rabin examined only
qualitative predictions of his model. For further details see Rabin (1993).
3.2 Sequential Reciprocity
The Dufwenberg - Kirchsteiger approach (2004) is in a way similar to Ra-
bin's model. Kindness depends solely on intentions and these are infered from
choices given available alternatives. The advance of the Dufwenberg - Kirch-
steiger model is that it can deal with the sequential structure of strategic
interactions and proposes a new solution concept, the sequential reciprocity
equilibrium. If the concept of sequential reciprocity equilibria is applied to
any two-player normal form game, the results are qualitatively similar to
Rabin's results.
To model the impact of intentions, one has to take into account the pos-
sibilities as well as the beliefs of the players. In a sequential game players
will have to revise their beliefs about how kind other players are as the game
proceeds. The way a player is aﬀected by reciprocity concerns may diﬀer
depending on her position in the game tree. With each new subgame that is
entered the reciprocity motivation might change. Thus a reasonable model
of reciprocity in sequential games must provide a solution for the problem of
changing beliefs and how they aﬀect reciprocity considerations.
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The model distinguishes between a player's initial and subsequent beliefs
and keeps track of the latter as new subgames are reached. It is assumed
that in each choice situation a player is motivated according to the beliefs
she has at that stage. The type of games analysed are ﬁnite multi-stage
games with observed actions. Games proceed in stages. Any player reaching
a stage along her path knows all preceeding choices, moves exactly once and
has no information about her opponents' choices at the same stage. Because
decisions are made simultaneously, games are of incomplete information.
N = {1, ...,n} is the set of players where n ≥ 2. H is the set of histories
or the set of choice proﬁles that lead to subgames. Ai is the set of strategies
of player i. A strategy assigns for each history a probability distribution on
the set of possible choices of i at h. For simpliﬁcation one can imagine that
players make pure strategy choices only. However, the concept also allows
for randomization. This can be thought of as frequencies with which pure
strategy choices are made in a population of players. A, the set of all strategy
combinations, is deﬁned as
∏
iN Ai. Each player's payoﬀ function depends
on what proﬁle in A is played. So pii :A→ R where pii is the material payoﬀ
function measuring money or some other objectively measurable quantity.
The utility of player i consists of both the material payoﬀ and the socalled
reciprocity payoﬀ. Bij = Aj is the set of possible beliefs of player i about the
strategy of player j. Cijk = Bjk = Ak is the set of possible beliefs of player
i about the belief of player j about the strategy of player k. Each player's
behavior, beliefs, kindness and perception of other players' kindness might
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diﬀer across histories.
ai(h) is an updated strategy after history h. All choices that deﬁne h
are given probability 1 since they are already past. For all other (future)
choices the strategy corresponds to aiAi. Assume that player i plays ai,
that she believes that the others play (bij)j 6=i and that she believes that the
others believe (cijk)k 6=j. After history h player i plays ai(h)Ai, believes that
the others play (bij(h))j 6=i and that they believe (cijk(h))k 6=j. The updating
of beliefs follows Bayes rule. Moreover, it is assumed that players treat the
choices of others as intentional and deliberate.
If i chooses ai and believes all other players choose (bij)j 6=i
∏
j 6=iBij he
expects that j 's material payoﬀ will be pij(ai,(bij)j 6=i). i believes the set of
feasible material payoﬀs for j to be {pij(a′i,(bij)j 6=i | a′iAi}. The relative size
of pij(ai,(bij)j 6=i) within the set of feasible payoﬀs determines how kind player
i is to player j.
Player i 's set of eﬃcient strategies is given by
Ei = {aiAi | there exists no a′iAi so that for allhH, (aj)j 6=i
∏
j 6=i
Aj, and kN
it holds that pik(a
′
i(h), (aj(h))j 6=i) ≥ pik(ai(h), (aj(h))j 6=i), with strict inequality
for some (h, (aj)j 6=i, k)}
A strategy is eﬃcient, if there exists no alternative strategy - given the
history of the game and given all subsequent choices by other players - that
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provides a higher material payoﬀ for some player without making any other
player worse oﬀ. Vice versa, a strategy is ineﬃcient, if there exists another
strategy - given the history of the game and all subsequent choices by the
other players - that provides no lower payoﬀ for any player and a higher mate-
rial payoﬀ for some player for some history of the game including subsequent
choices of the others.
As a reference point to measure how kind player i is to player j an equi-
table payoﬀ for player j given i 's beliefs (bij)j 6=i is introduced. The equitable
payoﬀ pieij ((bij)j 6=i) is an average between the lowest and the highest material
payoﬀ of j, if i chooses an eﬃcient strategy:
pieij ((bij)j 6=i) =
1
2
[max{pij(ai, (bij)j 6=i) | aiAi}+min{pij(ai, (bij)j 6=i) | aiEi}]
If i chooses a strategy so that pij = pi
ei
j his kindness to j is zero, which means
that he is neither kind nor unkind towards player j. The kindness of player
i to j at history h is given by the function:
Kij : Aij ×
∏
j 6=i
Bij → R
Kij(ai(h), (bij(h))j 6=i) = pij(ai(h), (bij(h))j 6=i)− pieij ((bij(h))j 6=i)
In words, a positive diﬀerence between the actual payoﬀ and the equitable
payoﬀ of j arises from kind behavior of i and a negative diﬀerence from
unkind behavior of i. Kindness cannot directly be observed by the players,
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but they have beliefs about the other players' actions and beliefs. From these
beliefs they infer how kindly their opponents are actually acting. Player i 's
beliefs about how kind player j is to him at history h are described by the
function lll
λiji(bij(h), (cijk(h))k 6=j) = pii(bij(h), (cijk(h))k 6=j)− pieij ((cijk(h))k 6=j)
The function λiji is mathematically equivalent to Kij since Bij = Aj and
Cijk = Bjk. However, λiji captures a psychological component aﬀecting
player i.
The utility of player i at h is given by a function of the form U i : Ai ×∏
j 6=i(Bij ×
∏
k 6=j Cijk) → R. It is the sum of the material payoﬀ and the
reciprocity payoﬀs with respect to each player j 6= i:
U i(ai(h), (bij(h), (cijk(h))k 6=j) = pii(ai(h), (bij(h))j 6=i)+
+
∑
jN 8i
(Yij ·Kij(ai(h), (bij(h)j 6=i) · λiji(bij(h), (cijk(h))k 6=j))
where Y ij is an exogenously given non-negative number for each j 6= i. It
measures the degree to which a player is aﬀected by reciprocity motivation.
This sensitivity to reciprocity can vary, depending on which other player is
concerned. If Y ij > 0 and i believes that j is kind to him, then i 's reciprocity
payoﬀ with respect to j is increasing in i 's kindness to j. The higher λiji(·)
is, the more material payoﬀ player i is ready to sacriﬁce in order to do j a
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favour. On the other hand, if i believes that j is unkind to him, which means
that λiji(·) is negative, his reciprocity payoﬀ with respect to j is decreasing
the more kind i is to j. When player i is optimizing his utility, he has to take
into account reciprocity payoﬀs with respect to all other players plus his own
material payoﬀ.
In equilibrium all players make optimal choices in each history given their
beliefs. Following each history, beliefs are updated. The proﬁle a? = (a?i )iN
is a sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE), if for all iN and for each hH
the following conditions hold:
(i) a∗i (h)argmaxUi(ai, (bij(h), cijk(h))k 6=j)j 6=i),
(ii) bij = a
∗
j for all j 6= i,
(iii) cijk = a
∗
k for all j 6= i, k 6= j
Verbally, a strategy proﬁle is a sequential reciprocity equilibrium, if at
each history each player makes choices that maximize his utility given his
beliefs and given that he follows his equilibrium strategy at other histories.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) require that initial beliefs are correct. Condition (i)
further implies that beliefs assign probability one to the sequence of choices
that deﬁne the history of the game and otherwise equal the initial beliefs.
If Y ij = 0 for all i, jN , the utility functions only consist of material
payoﬀs. In such a game, the sequential reciprocity equilibrium is a simple
subgame perfect equilibrium as used in standard game theory. For Y ij > 0,
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proving existence of a sequential reciprocity equilibrium is more demanding.
The problem arises from the fact that kindness and perceived kindness de-
pend on beliefs about actions following all histories - also histories that do
not follow h. Therefore in general it is not possible to determine equilibrium
choices by analysing isolated subgames, which means that the usual tool of
backwards induction cannot be used. The solution is to look at all histories
simultaneously. Applying Kakutani's ﬁxed point theorem to a best-reply
correspondence which distinguishes between players and between diﬀerent
histories, one can show that there exists a sequential reciprocity equilibrium
in every psychological game with reciprocity incentives.
A relatively easy application of the Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger model is the
centipede game. It is a two-player game with 1,...M nodes where M ≥ 2.
At the beginning of the game player 1 starts with one unit of material payoﬀ
and player 2 with two units of material payoﬀ. At each node a player can
decide whether to stay in the game or whether to end it. Player 1 makes
her decisions at odd nodes and player 2 at even nodes. If player 1 stays, the
material payoﬀ of player 2 increases by two units whereas her own material
payoﬀ declines by one unit and the next node is reached. The same is true
for player 2 vice versa. If a player decides to ﬁnish the game, the material
payoﬀs of both players do not change and the game ends. Each player's
strategy determines at each node whether to continue or end the game.
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Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
The ﬁgure shows a centipede game with four nodes.
e(s1,s2) denotes the ﬁrst node where one of the players ends the game given
they play their strategies s1 and s2. If e(s1,s2) is odd, the material payoﬀs are
given by pi1(s1,s2) =
(e(s1,s2)+1)
2
and pi2(s1,s2) =
(e(s1,s2)−1)
2
. If the ending node
is even, material payoﬀs are pi1(s1,s2) =
(e(s1,s2)−1)
2
and pi2(s1,s2) =
(e(s1,s2)+1)
2
.
Because of the symmetry of the game it is suﬃcient to consider only the case
where M is even. If both players decide to stay at all nodes, payoﬀs are
pi1(s1,s2) =
M
2
+ 1 and pi2(s1,s2) = M2 .
By the logic of backwards induction standard game theory predicts that in
the only Nash equilibrium player 1 ends the game at the ﬁrst node. However,
experimental testing has shown that most people stay in the game at the ﬁrst
nodes. Rabin's model of reciprocity can be applied to the normal form of
the game. If reciprocity motives are strong enough, the model gives multiple
equilibria - in some of them player 1 ends the game at the ﬁrst node and
in another one players stay in the game at all nodes. In the Dufwenberg-
Kirchsteiger model there is a unique sequential reciprocity equilibrium in
which both players stay until the last node, provided that at least one of
the players suﬃciently cares for reciprocity. It is suﬃcient that one player is
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motivated by reciprocity, because then the other non-reciprocal player can
convince the reciprocal player by staying that he is being kind, no matter
whether he actually cares for the opponent or not.
In all sequential reciprocity equilibria it holds at the last node M (at
which player 2 makes the decision) that: (a) if Y 2 > 2M player 2 stays, (b)
if Y 2 < 2M+2 player 2 exits and (c) if
2
M+2
< Y2 <
2
M
player 2 stays with a
probability of p = 1+M
2
− 1
Y2
. It is intuitive that players with a strong concern
for reciprocity will stay even at the last node whereas players who only feel
little motivated by reciprocity will not. The more stages the centipede game
has, the less reciprocity motivation is needed to make player 2 stay at the
last node. This is because the more stages there are in total, the more often
player 1 has already chosen to stay until the last node is reached. That
means player 1's kindness to player 2 increases with the number of nodes
and so a smaller Y 2 is needed to make player 2 give up some of his material
payoﬀ in order to reciprocate 1's kindness. A formal proof can be found in
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
Another observation is that if Y i < 2M+2 for i=1,2 the only sequential
reciprocity equilibrium is such that both players want to end the game at
any node that is reached.
Proof 3.2.1 It can be shown that player 2 will exit at node M if Y i < 2M+2 .
At any node k it is optimal to end the game given that all players exit at all
nodes larger than k. This results from the fact that the material payoﬀ of
player i decreases by one unit if he stays, since at k+1 the other player will
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end the game anyway. The diﬀerence in player i's kindness between choosing
to stay or leave is -2 because j's material payoﬀ decreases by 2 if i chooses
to stay instead of go. Therefore the diﬀerence in i's utility between choosing
to end the game or continue is 1 − 2Y iλiji(·). It is clear that λiji cannot be
greater than M
4
+ 1
2
. So whenever Y i <
2
M+2
at any node k i's utility from
ending the game is larger than staying.
If on the other hand Y 2 > 2M , there exists a unique sequential reciprocity
equilibrium where both players stay in the game at all nodes. Whether such
an SRE, where players stay until the end, exists depends on how much player
2 is motivated by reciprocity. Interestingly enough, it is not relevant whether
player 1 also cares for reciprocity.
Proof 3.2.2 It is clear that player 2 will stay at node M. The crucial node
is thus node M-1. Consistency of beliefs requires that player 1 believes that
2 will always stay whenever node M-1 is reached. At M-1 player 1 wants to
stay because his material payoﬀ from staying at M-1 is strictly larger than
from ending the game there. Moreover, staying is also the kindest choice
player 1 can make at M-1. Also player 2's behavior is clearly kind. So if
Y 1 > 0, the psychological part of 1's utility function is also maximal, if he
chooses to stay. For any Y 1 player 1 will decide to stay at M-1. (If Y 1 = 0
the psychological part of 1's utility function is equal to zero.) At node M-2
player 2 decides whether to stay or leave the game. By the same logic as
before, player 2 will choose to stay. Reasoning further backwards gives that
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at any node in the game players stay in the game.
Another question is whether the same logic can be applied if only player
1 is motivated by reciprocity and player 2 is not. It has already been shown
that if 2's sensitivity to reciprocity is low, he will end the game at node M.
If M=2 player 2's behavior is clearly unkind and so player 1 cannot have an
incentive to stay at the ﬁrst node. But if the number of stages is suﬃciently
high and player 2 has chosen to stay in the game several times, player 1
might perceive 2's behavior as kind no matter what 2 does at the last node.
A suﬃciently reciprocity motivated player 1 might therefore decide to stay
at M-1, regardless of what he thinks player 2 will chose to do at M. If this
should be the case, player 2 - reciprocity motivated or not - should stay at
all nodes preceding M-1. Such a sequential reciprocity equilibrium, where
only player 1's reciprocity motivation guarantees that the game does not end
before the last node, can only be reached if M > 6 and Y 1 > 2M−6 . For a
detailed proof see Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
Sequential reciprocity equilibria need not be unique and they need not
exist in pure strategies. The Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger model works well for
many games, e.g. the sequential prisoners' dilemma or the centipede game
as seen before. However, it fails - like other models of reciprocity - to explain
behavior in dictator games.
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3.3 Levine's model of reciprocity
Levine (1998) suggests a diﬀerent approach to measuring kindness. In Levine's
model - as opposed to other reciprocity models - players do not react to kind
or unkind actions. They punish or reward spiteful or altruistic types of play-
ers. The question is not whether opponents play fairly but whether they are
kind people. This has the advantage of avoiding the problem that there is no
obvious notion of fairness that applies to all games. Levine uses experimen-
tal results from ultimatum games and the ﬁnal round of a centipede game in
order to ﬁt his model and to deduce the distribution of spite and altruism in
the population.
The basic idea of models of interdependent preferences is that utility is
a linear function of both the player's own payoﬀ and his opponent's payoﬀ:
ui = pii+
∑
j 6=i
βijuj. The coeﬃcient on the own monetary payoﬀ is normalized
to one. The problem then is to determine β, the coeﬃcient on the opponent's
payoﬀ. In fact, this speciﬁcation of the model is too simpliﬁed to meet reality.
Levine (1998) develops a more adequate approach. He assumes that
within a population there are diﬀerent types of people, some having posi-
tive, others having negative coeﬃcients. These are all private information
and the distribution of types is ﬁxed across diﬀerent games. Players' weights
on opponents' monetary payoﬀs depend both on their own coeﬃcient of spite
or altruism and on what they believe their opponents' coeﬃcients are. In this
perspective we are analyzing signaling games. All actions taken potentially
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reveal how altruistic or spiteful players are and this is what opponents care
about.
Consider n person, i=1,..., n, extensive form games. Utility functions are
given by
U i = pii +
∑
j 6=i
αi + λαj
1 + λ
pij
pii and pij are material payoﬀs. α is the coeﬃcient of altruism with −1 < α <
1. It measures the relative importance of another person's payoﬀ compared
to one's own payoﬀ. If αi > 0, player i is altruistic, if αi < 0, player i is
spiteful and if αi = 0 he is selﬁsh. α is bounded between -1 and 1 because
no player is supposed to have a higher regard for his or her opponent than
for him- or herself. λ is a universal reciprocity parameter, which means that
all players are assumed to have the same λ. When λ = 0, the model is
one of pure altruism. When λ > 0, the model incorporates an element of
fairness. Players are more willing to be altruistic towards players who have
been altruisitic towards them.
A population of players has a distribution of altruism coeﬃcients repre-
sented by a common cumulative distribution function F (αi). F has ﬁnite
support for any given monetary payoﬀs in a game. The individual αi is pri-
vate information, whereas the distribution F is common knowledge. People
have an initial prior about the type of their opponent and after observing
their opponent's actions, players update their beliefs. If an action is judged
as kind, the person behind the action will be judged kind, too.
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The equilibrium concept used is that of a sequential equilibrium. If games
are suﬃciently simple, sequential equilibria coincide with perfect Bayes Nash
equilibria. All equilibria that will be discussed in the following also satisfy
the monotonicity requirement on beliefs in signaling games: beliefs are that
the type most likely to deviate is the type for whom it is most advantageous
to do so.
A drawback of the model is that it makes the analysis of games relatively
complicated. For the ultimatum game the theory works fairly well. Suppose
there is a total of 10 units of money to be divided between the two players.
Levine shows that regardless of F, in no sequential equilibrium any pro-
posal will be higher than 5 and any proposal of 5 or more will be accepted.
This is intuitive and consistent with actual data.
Proof 3.3.1 Consider a general utility function with interdependent pref-
erences: ui = pii +
∑
j 6=i
βijuj. The coeﬃcients βij can be determined from
players' types or other details of the game. As seen before Levine's speciﬁ-
cation of β corresponds to
∑
j 6=i
αi+λαj
1+λ
. Responder's utility in the ultimatum
game is given by (10− x) + βx where (10− x) is the proposal and x is what
the allocator demands for himself. If β > −1 and x ≤ 5, the expression is
positive. So indeed any proposal of 5 or more is accepted. The proposer's
utility x + β(10 − x) is increasing in x for β > −1. Therefore a proposer's
demand for himself below 5 can be increased without reducing the probability
that the responder accepts. So it cannot be optimal to propose more than 5.
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Empirically, allocators' demands for themselves are between 5 and 7. The
data we consider is the following:
Demand Observations Frequ. of obs. Acc. demands Prob. of acc.
5 37 28% 37 1
6 67 52% 55 0.8
7 26 20% 17 0.65
Roth et al. (1991)
It is assumed that the distribution of altruism coeﬃcients is in a way that
weight is placed on the points αh > α0 > αl, which are linked to altruistic,
normal and spiteful types of players. We look for an equilibrium in which the
altruistic type demands 5 (respectively proposes 5), the normal type demands
6 and the spiteful type 7. The probabilities of the types must then be 0.28,
0.52 and 0.2. A demand of 5 is accepted by all responders. A demand of 6
is accepted by the normal and altruistic types and rejected by the spiteful
types of responders. A demand of 7 is accepted by 65% of the population,
which corresponds to all the altruistic types and a fraction of the normal
types implying that normal types must be indiﬀerent between accepting and
rejecting an oﬀer of 3.
The parameters 1 > αh > α0 > αl > −1 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 consistent with
equilibrium must fulﬁl the following conditions:
(1) (6 + α0+λ(0.35α
h+0.65α0)
1+λ
· 4)0.8− (5 + α0+λ(0.28αh+0.52α0+0.2αl)
1+λ
· 5) ≥ 0
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(2) (6 + α
h+λ(0.35αh+0.65α0)
1+λ
·4)0.8− (5 + αh+λ(0.28αh+0.52α0+0.2αl)
1+λ
·5) ≤ 0
(3) 4 + α
l+λα0
1+λ
· 6 ≤ 0
(4) (7 + α
l+λ(0.43αh+0.57α0)
1+λ
· 3)0.65− (6 + αl+λ(0.35αh+0.65α0)
1+λ
· 4)0.8 ≥ 0
(5) (7 + α0+λ(0.43α
h+0.57α0)
1+λ
· 3)0.65− (6 + α0+λ(0.35αh+0.65α0)
1+λ
· 4)0.8 ≤ 0
(6) 3 + α0+λα
l
1+λ
· 7 = 0
(7) (7 + α
l+λ(0.43αh+0.57α0)
1+λ
· 3)0.65 ≥ 2.8
Proof 3.3.2 Consider the case of a demand of 5. The proposer's adjusted
utility demanding 5 for himself is thus (5 + 5 · α+λ(0.28αh+0.52α0+0.2αl)
1+λ
). The
demand is made by an altruistic type. For the spiteful type to accept it must
hold that 5+ α
l+λαh
1+λ
·5 ≥ 0. For αl,αh > −1 this inequality is always satisﬁed.
If the spiteful type accepts, all types will accept.
If the proposer demands 6, altruistic and normal types accept. The utility
gained by the proposer is (6 + α+λ(0.35α
h+0.65α0)
1+λ
· 4)0.8. For the normal type
of proposer (and therefore also for the spiteful type) this must be higher than
the utility from only keeping 5. This implies constraint (1):
(6 + α0+λ(0.35α
h+0.65α0)
1+λ
· 4)0.8− (5 + α0+λ(0.28αh+0.52α0+0.2αl)
1+λ
· 5) ≥ 0
On the other hand, for the altruistic type keeping 6 must lead to a lower
utility than keeping 5, which leads to constraint (2):
(6 + α
h+λ(0.35αh+0.65α0)
1+λ
· 4)0.8− (5 + αh+λ(0.28αh+0.52α0+0.2αl)
1+λ
· 5) ≤ 0
Responder behavior must make spiteful types reject and normal types as
well as altruistic types accept. The demand of 6 is by assumption made by a
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normal type proposer. The spiteful type rejects if 4 + α
l+λα0
1+λ
· 6 ≤ 0 which is
constraint (3).
The proof of conditions (4) to (7) works in a similar way and can be found
in Levine (1998).
Further characteristics of the equilibrium can be examined:
There is no sequential equilibrium with λ = 0. This means that a model
of pure altruism does not ﬁt the data of the ultimatum game. This is because
the high rejection rates imply that players must be relatively spiteful. But
on the other hand spiteful proposers would not make as generous proposals
as observed.
Proof 3.3.3 We have 3 + α0+λα
l
1+λ
· 7 = 0 since the normal type must be
indiﬀerent to accepting or rejecting. If λ = 0, α0 = −37 . This means that
even the normal type is quite spiteful. If α0 equals −37 , the normal type
proposer gets a utility of 3.43 when demanding 6 for himself, and 3.71 when
demanding 7 for himself. This contradicts the incentive constraint 5.
Furthermore, it can be shown that in a sequential equilibrium, −0.301 ≤
α0 ≤ −0.095, −1 < αl < −0.73 and 0.584 ≥ λ ≥ 0.222. The proof relies
on conditions (6) and (3) and some algebraic manipulation. For details see
Levine (1998).
There are many possible sequential equilibria consistent with the data.
There is most ﬂexibility for αh and less for αl and λ. Probably many sepa-
rating equilibria other than the one described exist and one can show that
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there are two pooling equilibria - one at 7 and one at 8. The variety of pos-
sible equilibria raises the question about the predictive power of the model.
Compared to the standard self-regarding theory the model proves worthwile.
It is above all useful when thinking about games in which mixed strategy
equilibria are observed. A selﬁsh player can, at the Nash equilibrium, cost-
lessly transfer money to or from his opponent because he is indiﬀerent to
doing so or not. A deviation from the Nash equilibrium depends on whether
the marginal indiﬀerent player is altruistic or spiteful. A spiteful marginal
player wants to transfer money away from his opponent. Anticipating this,
the opponent will adjust his strategy to keep the spiteful player indiﬀerent.
The result is that in a symmetric game equilibrium payoﬀs will be higher
than they would be if players were purely selﬁsh.
However, not for all games Levine's model can predict experimental out-
comes. An example is the dictator game. Evidence shows that positive con-
tributions are made though the model, because of linear utility and αi < 1,
predicts no contributions at all.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of altruism coeﬃcients that are consistent
with the experimental data Levine (1998) used when calibrating his model. It
is striking that 20% of the population have a very strong negative coeﬃcient
of - 0.9.
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Levine (1998)
A study by Van Huyck et al. 1996 casts doubt on these altruism coeﬃcients.
In a public goods game experiment they found very little spitefulness and
less altruism. The diﬀerences in the setting were that they implemented the
game as one-shot and that they included four players. So it might be that
the altruism coeﬃcient is not independent of how many players there are. If
spite is understood as a drive to increase competitiveness by harming oppo-
nents this might be plausible. It is also likely that the diﬀerence in altruism
coeﬃcients arises from the extensive form of the games Levine analyses. This
would mean that retaliation for past spiteful behavior is not only due to the
signaling of types.
4 Inequity aversion versus reciprocity models
4.1 Interaction of outcomes and intentions
When discussing mini-ultimatum games I came to the conclusion that mod-
els of inequity aversion fail to correctly predict diﬀerent rejection rates for
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identical oﬀers. Distributive concerns are not or not solely able to deal with
probelms connected with set dependence. Therefore another approach, reci-
procity based models, were examined. It is left to discuss whether reciprocity
models can better explain the behavior observed in mini-ultimatum games.
The purely intention based models of Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) can in principle account for diﬀerent rejection rates across
games. However, the reason for this is that they oﬀer multiple equilibria.
Rabin's model is compatible both with acceptance and rejection of the (8/2)-
oﬀer in all games. The same is true for the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
model in three of the four games. If the number of potential equilibria is
too high, the use of these models as predictive tools is of course limited.
Moreover, pure reciprocity models, where the only reason for rejecting an
oﬀer is the perceived unkindness of an intention, state that rejections cannot
occur, if proposers cannot signal any intention. In the case of the (8/2)-game
the proposer has no chance but to oﬀer the responder 2. If there has been no
choice for the proposer, the other player does not receive a signal about the
proposer's intention. If only intentions matter, there should be no rejections
in the (8/2)-game. However, empirically 18% of the responders reject the
(8/2)-distribution even if proposers did not have a choice. (Falk, Fehr, and
Fischbacher 2003)
The results of the mini-ultimatum game show that a fairness model that
is exclusively based on either distributional preferences or on the attribu-
tion of kind or unkind intentions is incomplete. A study of Blount (1995)
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also shows that both inferred intentions and outcomes determine people's
behavior. Blount conducted a modiﬁed version of the ultimatum game, in
which oﬀers were determined randomly and consequently could not signal
any intentions. The acceptance rate is found to be signiﬁcantly higher in
this non-intentional treatment, but even without signaling intentions very
disadvantageous oﬀers were sometimes rejected.
Another experiment by Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2000), also points
into the same direction. The game analysed is the so-called moonlighting
game. This is a two-player, two-stage game with sequential moves. The
initial endowment of both players is 12 units of money.
• At the ﬁrst stage the ﬁrst player, say player A, can choose an action
a{−6,−5,−4, ..., 4, 5, 6}.
 If a ≥ 0 player B is given 3a points and player A loses a points.
If a < 0 player B loses | a | points and player A gains | a | points.
If A chooses e.g. a = −5, she takes away 5 units of money from
player B. If A chooses for example a = 3, she gives 3a = 9 units
of money to player B.
• After player B has observed a, she chooses an action
b{−6,−5,−4, ..., 16, 17, 18}.
 If b takes on a positive value the action can be interpreted as a
reward. Reversely a negative b can be seen as a punishment. Thus
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the game allows for a distinction between positive and negative
reciprocal reactions. If b is positive, player B gives away b points
and A receives b points. If b is negative, B has to pay | b |points
and A loses 3 | b | points. After B's decision the game ends and
ﬁnal payoﬀs are determined.
In the experiment player B had to indicate what her response would be for
any possible action of player A before she was informed about the actual
choice of A. The advantage of this procedure was that there was enough
data to study the relevance of intentions at any level of a. Two treatments
were conducted. In the intention treatment it was player A that determines
her choice. She was responsible for the signal she sends to player B and for
the consequences of her decision. In the no-intention treatment A was not
free to choose her strategy. Her move was determined by a random device
and therefore no intentions could be infered by the second player. Players
were randomly assigned to the roles of player A and B.
Self-regarding preferences imply that the only subgame perfect equilib-
rium is that in both treatments B will always choose b = 0 because for
any other choice she would have to give up some of her own payoﬀ. An-
ticipating B's behavior, A chooses a = −6 in the intention treatment. In
the no-intention treatment A has no inﬂuence on a. Inequity aversion mod-
els predict that suﬃciently strong inequity averse players show behavioral
patterns that look similar to reciprocity-induced behavior. That means b is
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increasing in a and b = 0 if a = 0. Since the attribution of intentions is
not assumed to have an inﬂuence on the outcome, for a given a responses in
the intention treatment and the no-intention treatment must be exactly the
same. The Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger model of reciprocity assumes that
reciprocal responses solely appear in reaction to infered intentions. There-
fore no reciprocal behavior should appear in the no-intention treatment and
b should be equal to zero. For the case of the intention treatment predictions
are ambiguous. There are multiple equilibria. In some of them b is increas-
ing in a and in others b is decreasing in a. The Falk and Fischbacher model
(2006) which I will present in the following chapter combines the aspects of
inequity aversion and reciprocity. For the intention treatment it predicts that
there is a unique equilibrium where b is increasing in a. In the no-intention
treatment b is also predicted to be increasing in a, but less so than in the
intention treatment.
112 subjects participated in the experiment. Results clearly show that
in the intention treatment B players exhibit strong reciprocal behavior. Av-
erage and median rewards are increasing in a and the more unkind player
A, the higher is B's punishment. Comparing the no-intention treatment to
the intention treatment signiﬁcant diﬀerences can be observed. On average
reciprocal responses, both positive and negative, are much weaker in the no-
intention treatment. Only for suﬃciently high or low a it is true that b 6= 0.
However, reciprocity is statistically signiﬁcant even in the no-intention treat-
ment. For almost all a 6= 0 the diﬀerence between decisions of B players
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between the two treatments is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%-level.
Given these results, the predictions of standard game theory with self-
regarding preferences can be rejected since reciprocity is unambiguously ob-
served. Also the predictions of the inequity aversion models do not hold
because there is signiﬁcant diﬀerence between behavior in the two treat-
ments. Both positive and negative reciprocity are observed. The prediction
of the Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger model that there is no reciprocity in the no-
intention treatment is also falsiﬁed.
Generally speaking, the models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000), Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) all
lack either the intentional or the distributional aspect. Best performance
can be expected from models that combine both motivations as those of Falk
and Fischbacher (2006) and Charness and Rabin (2002) which I will brieﬂy
discuss in the following chapters.
4.2 Falk and Fischbacher's model of reciprocity
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) developed a model that accounts for both dis-
tributional and reciprocity motivations. The underlying assumption is that
people evaluate the kindness of an action by its consequences as well as the
actor's intentions. Fairness can be signaled if the actor's choice set allows
the choice between a fair and an unfair action and if the actor's choice is un-
der her full control. Falk and Fischbacher conducted a questionnaire study
in order to ﬁnd out how people evaluate the kindness of particular actions.
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111 subjects at the University of Zurich were asked to imagine a bilateral ex-
change situation. Subjects had to indicate how kind or unkind they perceived
diﬀerent divisions of 10 Swiss Francs. They could express their judgements
by assigning numbers between -100 and +100 to the proposed distributions.
-100 points means the outcome is most unkind and +100 points means the
outcome is kindest. The set of choices of the opponent was systematically
varied and subjects were asked how they felt about diﬀerent actions for each
of the opponent's choice sets. Results of the study clarify that perceived
kindness is monotonically increasing in the oﬀer to the responder. It seems
that an equitable share of the total payoﬀ serves as a reference point to de-
termine what is a fair or unfair oﬀer. At the equitable oﬀer of ﬁve Swiss
Francs, the sign changes from minus to plus. All oﬀers below ﬁve are judged
as unkind and all oﬀers above ﬁve as kind. When evaluating the intentions
of a particular action, people take into account the actor's strategy set. If a
choice set contains only one element, the perceived kindness or unkindness
from this action is much weaker than for the same choice made if an alter-
native would have been available. However, even in case the actor cannot
signal any intention because she has no alternative, the perceived kindness
or unkindness of an action is not zero. This shows that also outcomes by
themselves are important and reciprocity alone cannot explain the data. An
action is judged as kind, if the actor could have made a less friendly oﬀer.
Likewise the perception of an unkind oﬀer depends on whether the actor
could have been more kind. In case there is an option to make a friendlier
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oﬀer, perceived intentions also depend on how much the actor would have to
sacriﬁce in order to make the kinder choice. People often don't take an un-
fair oﬀer amiss, if the alternative would be that the actor puts herself into a
disadvantageous position. Generally speaking, fairness intention perception
is not symmetric with respect to kindness and unkindness. For example,
the kindness of giving 8 is on average judged with 62 points, whereas the un-
kindness of giving 2 is judged with -71.9 points. These empirical observations
were used to formulate the Falk and Fischbacher model.
The model is applicable to sequential games and tries to capture reci-
procity in two parts: kind or unkind behavior is captured by a kindness term
ϕ and the behavioral reaction to that behavior is represented by a reciproca-
tion term σ. The game that is produced is called a reciprocity game, which
belongs to the class of psychological games. The Falk-Fischbacher model
requires extensive use of notation. In the following I will restrain myself to
only giving a short overview of the model.
Players' utilities depend on monetary payoﬀs and on the so-called reci-
procity utility. Formally, player i 's utility function in the reciprocity game
is given by
Ui(f, s
′′
i , s
′
i) = pii(f) + ρi
∑
n→f,nNi
ϕj(n, s
′′
i , s
′
i) · σi(n, f, s′′i , s′i)
where pii(f) is the monetary payoﬀ and f is an end node that follows node
n. si is the strategy of player i. s′i is the ﬁrst-order belief of player i, i.e.
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her belief about the strategy player j will choose and s′′i is player i 's second-
order belief, i.e. her belief about player j 's belief about which strategy i
will choose. The reciprocity utility consists of the kindness term ϕj, the
reciprocation term σi and the reciprocity parameter ρi.
The kindness term ϕ measures how kind a person judges the action by
another person. It consists of an outcome term that measures whether an
outcome is advantageous or disadvantageous and of an intention factor which
captures the degree of intentionality of the opponent's action. Player i com-
pares her payoﬀ with a reference standard. If i thinks that j wants more for
himself than for i, she feels that j is acting unkindly. On the other hand, if j
wants less for himself than for i, i thinks she is treated kindly. The recipro-
cation term σi measures the response to perceived kindness, i.e. how much i
alters j 's payoﬀ in reaction to him at node n. The reciprocity parameter ρi
is positive, constant and common knowledge. It measures how much player
i values reciprocity utility relative to utility gained from the material payoﬀ.
If ρi is equal to zero, player i cares only for monetary payoﬀ. If ρj is also
zero and if there are only two players, the reciprocity game is reduced to
a standard game. Kindness is measured in each node. When in a node n
player i feels that her opponent is being kind, she can increase her utility by
increasing j 's payoﬀ, given that ρi is positive. The overall reciprocity utility
is the sum of the reciprocity utility in each node weighted with ρ.
A reciprocity equilibrium is a subgame perfect psychological Nash equilib-
rium. It does not always exist. In a reciprocity equilibrium utilities depend
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on strategies and beliefs, where beliefs are taken as given. In an equilibrium
all beliefs have to match actual behavior. Though the Falk and Fischbacher
model considers sequential games, only initial believes enter the utility. The
problem of the sequential structure is overcome by updating in the outcome
and in the reciprocation term. Utility components are deﬁned in each node
and beliefs about actions, which are not part of the current subgame, are
irrelevant for determining those components. This approach diﬀers from the
method applied in the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger model, i.e. maximizing
of utility in each node using updated beliefs.
The Falk and Fischbacher model can be applied to various games, e.g. the
ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, reduced best-shot games, market
games, the dictator game, the sequential prisoner's dilemma or the centipede
game. For a detailed discussion of the model and its applications see Falk
and Fischbacher (2006).
There are two major diﬀerences between the model of Falk and Fisch-
bacher (2006) and those of Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004). Falk and Fischbacher assume that people care for a combination of
outcomes and underlying intentions, whereas the other two models adopt a
purely intention driven approach to reciprocity. The other - probably less
obvious - diﬀerence is the way how kindness is supposed to be evaluated by
the players. The Falk and Fischbacher concept of fairness is based on pay-
oﬀ comparisons among players. In order to assess the kindness of a move,
player j compares his resulting payoﬀ with that of his opponents. On the
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other hand, Rabin as well as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger do not model
players' considerations about whether they have more or less than others.
They assume that players compare the outcome actually chosen with the
alternative actions an opponent could have chosen. Player i is supposed to
be unfair if she could have taken an alternative eﬃcient action yielding a
higher payoﬀ for player j. So kindness in the Falk and Fischbacher model
is based on interpersonal comparison and in the Rabin and Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger models it is based on comparison of alternative actions.
4.3 Charness and Rabin's model of reciprocity
Charness and Rabin (2002) examine social motivations based on 29 diﬀerent
games, with 467 participants making 1697 decisions. They aim to eliminate
confounds within games by testing a fuller range of possible departures from
self-interest. This allows to test existing theories more directly than the
games commonly studied. The aim is to formulate a new model that captures
patterns of behavior that previous models could not explain.
Consider the following simple model of social preferences in two-person
games: piA and piB are the monetary payoﬀs of players A and B. Player B's
utility function is given by
UB(piA, piB) = (ρ · r + σ · s+ θ · q) · piA + (1− ρ · r − σ · s− θ · q) · piB
where r = 1 if piB > piA, and r = 0 otherwise; s = 1 if piB < piA, and s = 0
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otherwise; q = −1 if A has been unkind, and q = 0 otherwise. In words,
B's utility is a weighted sum of his own monetary payoﬀ and his opponent's
payoﬀ. The weight B places on A's payoﬀ depends on whether A has a higher
or lower material payoﬀ than B and on whether A has behaved kindly or not.
Another way of writing the utility function is to distinguish two cases: when
piB ≥ piA : UB(piA, piB) = (1− ρ− θq) · piB + (ρ+ θq) · piA
and when
piB ≤ piA : UB(piA, piB) = (1− σ − θq) · piB + (σ + θq)piA
Diﬀerent parameter ranges of the model incorporate diﬀerent existing the-
ories of social preferences. θ is a mechanism for modeling reciprocity. The
parameters ρ and σ represent distributional concerns.
Distributional preferences can take the form of simple competitive pref-
erences. If σ ≤ ρ ≤ 0, player B cares not only directly about his own payoﬀ,
but also strives to be as well oﬀ as possible in comparison to his opponent. A
competitive player likes his or her payoﬀ to be as high as possible relatively to
the payoﬀs of others. The theory of inequality aversion assumes the opposite.
People try to minimize diﬀerences between their own monetary payoﬀs and
their opponents' payoﬀs if σ < 0 < ρ < 1. If 1 ≥ ρ ≥ σ > 0, subjects exhibit
social-welfare preferences. They always prefer more for themselves and for
others, but give more weight to their own payoﬀs when they get less than
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other players than when they get more. In the two-player case social-welfare
preferences are related to the idea that players want to help all players and
particularly care about the person who is worst oﬀ.
Reciprocity implies that player B's values of ρ and σ vary with B's percep-
tion of A's intentions. If players have preferences as supposed in the model
of Falk and Fischbacher, the parameters should be σ < 0 < ρ < 1 if they feel
positive or neutral toward another person. If A's behavior makes B think
that A puts a weight ρ ≤ 0 to his well-being, B's values for ρ and σ diminish.
B retaliates against A's behavior if this is due to a small ρ but not if it is
due to a small or negative σ. This means B does not want to harm A, if A is
selﬁsh when being worse oﬀ. However, B wishes to hurt A when A is selﬁsh
even when she is better oﬀ than B. Reciprocity can easily be captured by
assuming that θ > 0 when q = −1. If A has behaved unfairly, i.e. not in line
with social-welfare preferences, B lowers both ρ and σ by amount θ.
The empirical data underlying the model was gained from a series of
experiments. In each game, one or two participants made decisions that
aﬀected the payoﬀs of two or three players. Seven dictator games isolated
distributional preferences. Variations of the game allowed players to sacriﬁce
their own payoﬀ in order to decrease inequality or give up their own payoﬀ
to increase inequality and eﬃciency. Also the case where players can aﬀect
inequality at no cost to themselves was examined. These empirical results
allow for a characterization of ρ and σ.
Twenty response games were played. They opened a wide range of options
72
for both players. In some of the games entry by A hurted B and in others
entry of A helped B. There were games in which this help or harm was
compatible with inequality aversion or social-welfare preferences, and there
were others in which it was not. These response games were used to test
both for inequality aversion and reciprocity motivation. In order to facilitate
inferences about reciprocity based behavior, there were many sets of games
where B's choices are identical, but A's prior choice is varied.
The results of the dictator games show that the most eﬀective type of
preferences are social-welfare preferences, as long as care for reciprocity is
neglected. Roughly 70% of the decisions are in line with social-welfare pref-
erences. 20% are consistent with inequality aversion and 10% with compet-
itiveness. Similar results were obtained by Charness and Grosskopf (2001).
These proportions show how the models perform in explaining all behavior.
However, it may be more insightful to test how well models match when
they make unique predictions. It can again be shown that social-welfare
preferences outperform both inequality aversion and competitive preferences
in dictator games as well as in response games. (Charness and Rabin 2002)
An important driving force of behavior is supposed to be reciprocity.
Reciprocal behavior can be observed in response games. Indeed, in these
games the motivation for inequality aversion was overruled by positive reci-
procity. Furthermore, the results of the ultimatum games could be much
better explained by negative reciprocity than by inequality aversion. It can
be concluded that inequality aversion is not a strong factor when in conﬂict
73
with other social motives. Our results suggest that the apparent adequacy of
recent diﬀerence-aversion models has likely been an artifact of powerful and
decisive confounds in the games used to construct these models. (Charness
and Rabin 2002)
Summarizing, it can be said that reciprocity considerations are an impor-
tant component of behavior. When A hurts B, B is more likely to harm A
than otherwise and less likely to sacriﬁce in order to help A.
In addition to the two-player games, also three-player games experiments
were conducted. In multiperson models the question how players judge
changes in the distribution among other players' payoﬀs is discussed. It
is assumed that players like to improve the payoﬀs of everybody, but even
more so when their oppponents' payoﬀs are lower than their own payoﬀ. In
simpliﬁed and extreme form this is equal to minimax preferences, where play-
ers like to maximize the minimum payoﬀ among players. Empirically, people
seem to care about both, eﬃciency and minimum payoﬀs. Many subjects
chose to increase total payoﬀ at the expense of the minimum payoﬀ, while
others were more willing to maximize the minimum payoﬀ. Evidence is found
against the Bolton and Ockenfels model of inequality aversion which assumes
that players are concerned with the average payoﬀ of all other players and
not with the distribution of those payoﬀs. This could not be approved by
the experimental data.
An extension of the simple model of social preferences as described be-
fore, integrates social-welfare preferences with reciprocity into a multiperson
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model. It uses the framework of psychological Nash equilibria for implement-
ing reciprocity. For a discussion of the more complex and general model of
social preferences see Charness and Rabin (2002).
The model of Charness and Rabin (2002) does not incorporate the prin-
ciple of sequential rationality as discussed in the models of Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). It can capture much
of the experimental data but it does so at the cost of a high complexity and
many parameters. The reciprocity part is hard to analyze for a particular
game. Similar to the Levine and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger models the
problem of multiple equilibria arises, which limits its use as a predictive tool.
5 Conclusion
Insights into the nature of nonself-interested behavior give an important im-
pulse to economic theory.
This paper examined models of inequity aversion, models of reciprocity
and ﬁnally models that combine both aspects. It remains to be reasoned
which of the diﬀerent models performs best in explaining and forecasting
economic behavior. First of all, one has to be careful to be clear about what
a good performance of a model is. On the one hand, a good model should
capture psychological reality as well as possible, but on the other hand a
good model should also be tractable and broadly applicable.
The concept of reciprocity is intuitive and models based on this prin-
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ciple do well in explaining many games. Rabin (1993) models kindness as
solely determined by intentions. His model is only applicable to two-person
normal form games but found an extension in the work of Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) who set up a model of sequential reciprocity. A diﬀerent
approach was taken by Levine (1998). In his model players do not punish
or reward fair or unfair actions but kind or unkind types. A limitation of
these models is that there are multiple equilibria possible and they are often
diﬃcult to ﬁnd.
Inequality aversion models have an easier structure because they do not
explicitly deal with reciprocity motives. However, this does not imply that
inequity aversion models are not aware of the potential impact of perceived
intentions. Inequality aversion might work as a blackbox for more complex
preferences over outcomes and intentions. The lack of explicit modeling of
intentions in our model does, however, not imply that the model is incom-
patible with an intentions-based interpretation of reciprocal behavior. In
our model reciprocal behavior is driven by the preference parameters αi and
βi. The model is silent as to why αi and βi are positive. Whether these
parameters are positive because individuals care directly for inequality or
whether they infer intentions from actions that cause unequal outcomes is
not modeled. (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) The best performance in explain-
ing experimental data yield models that combine and explicitly model the
interaction of outcomes and intentions, i.e. the Falk and Fischbacher model
(2006) and the Charness and Rabin model (2002). However, these models
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have a highly complicated structure and use many parameters. This makes
it hard to apply them to particular games.
All models have their advantages and disadvantages. A higher predic-
tive power and more psychological accuracy come at the price of reduced
tractability. Therefore, it is a researcher's purpose that will determine which
model to use.
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7 Appendix
7.1 English Abstract
Self-regarding preferences cannot always account for empirically observed
behavior. Concerns for fairness seem to aﬀect how people behave e.g. in
bargaining games. This paper focuses on the ultimatum game and examines
models of reciprocity, inequality aversion and models that combine inten-
tional and distributional aspects. The Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality
aversion (1999) is more accurate than the Bolton and Ockenfels model (2000),
because it is often in line with minimax preferences. However, the concept of
inequality aversion does not capture the whole story since it neglects the im-
portance of perceived intentions. Reciprocity based models explicitly model
people's reactions to infered intentions. Doing so is more intuitive from a psy-
chological point of view, but on the other hand reduces the simplicity of the
models and allows for multiple equilibria. Experimental testing shows that
even (pure) reciprocity models cannot explain all the behavior empirically
observed. A more complete model must combine distributional concerns and
reciprocity motivation, as found in the Falk and Fischbacher model (2006) or
the Charness and Rabin model (2002). They are most convincing in the con-
text of completeness and psychological plausibility, but due to their highly
complex structure they are hardly applicable to concrete game-theoretic sit-
uations.
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7.2 German Abstract
In einer Vielzahl von Experimenten erwies sich, dass eine signiﬁkante Zahl
von Entscheidungsträgern sich nicht wie der üblicherweise angenommene
Homo Oeconomicus verhält. Diese Arbeit untersucht, vor allem anhand
des Ultimatum Spiels, verschiedene Modelle sozialer Präferenzen: Ungle-
ichheitsaversion, Reziprozität sowie Modelle, die beide Prinzipien vereinen.
Inequality Averison Modelle haben eine simple Struktur und sind leicht
anzuwenden. Das Fehr-Schmidt Modell (1999) ist dem Bolton-Ockenfels
Modell (2000) meist vorzuziehen. Beide können aber nicht alle beobachteten
Phänomene erklären, weil sie die Rolle von Intentionen vernachlässigen. Mod-
elle, die auf Reziprozität basieren, modellieren explizit wie Menschen auf
wahrgenommene Intentionen reagieren. Dies ist, von einem psychologis-
chen Standpunkt betrachtet, schlüssiger, birgt aber den Nachteil größerer
Komplexität der Modelle und multipler Gleichgewichte. Doch auch reine
Reziprozitäts-Modelle können das in Experimenten beobachtete Verhalten
nicht vollständig erklären. Die höchste Erklärungsrelevanz erzielen Modelle,
die sowohl distributive Aspekte als auch aus Aktionen abgeleitete Intentio-
nen miteinbeziehen. Beispiele dafür sind das Falk und Fischbacher Modell
(2006) sowie das Charness und Rabin Modell (2002). Beide überzeugen durch
größere Vollständigkeit und psychologische Schlüssigkeit, sind aber ob ihrer
hohen Komplexität in konkreten Spielen schwer anwendbar.
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